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High-Achieving Minority Students Can Have More Friends 
and Fewer Adversaries 
Evidence from Hungary 
 
Tamás Hajdu – Gábor Kertesi – Gábor Kézdi 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines friendship and hostility relations between Roma students and the 
ethnically homogeneous non-Roma majority in Hungarian schools, where anti-Roma 
sentiments are strong. High-achieving Roma students have significantly more friends and 
fewer adversaries than low-achieving ones because of more non-Roma friends, fewer non-
Roma adversaries, and the same number of Roma friends and adversaries. The associations 
are strong for publicly observable GPA but weak for unobserved test scores and may be the 
results of assignment to the same classes for many years. Simulations suggest that a mixed 
policy of desegregation and closing the achievement gap may best foster positive interethnic 
relations in this environment. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Social interactions, Minority students, Achievement gap 
 
JEL classification: J15, I24 
 
Acknowledgement:  
Our research was supported by the OTKA-101409 project (‘The role of parenting and 
networks in human capital formation’). Gábor Kertesi gratefully acknowledges support from 
the CEU Institute for Advanced Study.  
 
 
 
4 
 
Roma és nem roma tanulók közti barátságok  
és ellenségeskedések az általános iskolában 
 
Hajdu Tamás – Kertesi Gábor – Kézdi Gábor 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Tanulmányunk a roma és nem roma tanulók közti kapcsolatok (barátságok és elutasítások) 
létrejöttét meghatározó összefüggéseket vizsgálja a nyolcadik évfolyamra járó magyarországi 
tanulók egy mintáján. Az interetnikus barátságok létrejöttét alapvetően két hatás 
befolyásolja: a tanulók iskolai eredményei, illetve az, hogy a diákok milyen mértékben vannak 
kitéve egymás társaságának az osztályban. A jó tanulmányi eredményű roma tanulók 
szignifikánsan több nem roma baráttal és kevesebb nem roma ellenséggel rendelkeznek, mint 
a rosszul tanuló roma fiatalok. Közvetett bizonyítékok – az ti., hogy ez az összefüggés az 
osztálytársak körében ismert tanulmányi átlagra nézve robusztusan teljesül, a nem 
megfigyelhető teszteredményekre nézve pedig nem teljesül – utalnak arra, hogy a hatás 
oksági jellegű lehet. A hatás erősségéhez valószínűleg hozzájárul, hogy a magyarországi 
általános iskolások tartós osztályközösségekben, egymást jól ismerve töltik el az általános 
iskola nyolc évét. Szimulációs számításokkal támasztjuk alá azt a következtetésünket, hogy az 
oktatáspolitika egy kombinált stratégiával tudná a leghatékonyabban elősegíti az interetnikus 
barátságokat az iskolában: egyfelől, ha vegyes osztályok létrehozásával teremtene lehetőséget 
a roma és nem roma gyerekek közötti kontaktusokra, másfelől, ha a roma tanulókra is 
kiterjedő oktatási reformokkal javítaná a hátrányos helyzetű tanulók iskolai teljesítményeit, 
így azzal növelné a roma és nem roma tanulók közötti barátkozások esélyét, hogy csökkenti a 
köztük meglevő társadalmi távolságot. 
 
Tárgyszavak: roma tanulók, általános iskola, interetnikus barátságok és 
ellenségeskedések, iskolai szegregáció 
 
JEL kódok: J15, I24 
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Friendship and hostility relations between adolescents from a disadvantaged minority and 
the majority are important: They may foster the social integration of members of the 
minority and may help develop tolerant attitudes among members of the majority. Schools 
offer the most important environment for building such relationships among adolescents. 
Using randomized assignment to roommates and military squadrons in the U.S., recent 
studies show that white American college students become more open towards African 
Americans when they are matched with African American college students (Boisjoly, Duncan, 
Kremer, Levy and Eccles 2006, Marmaros and Sacerdote 2006, Carrell, Hoekstra, and West 
2015). The effect is particularly strong if they are matched with high-achieving African 
American students as opposed to low-achieving ones (Carrell, Hoekstra, and West 2015). 
Contrary to these findings, high-achieving minority students in American middle schools and 
high schools do not appear to have more friends than low-achieving minority students (Fryer 
and Torelli 2010).* Whether it is the age of the students, the nature of the college 
environment, the selected quality of college students, or the intensity of the exposure that 
makes the difference is difficult to tell without further evidence. 
In this paper we analyze the friendship and hostility relations among 15-year-old students 
from a disadvantaged minority and an ethnically homogeneous majority. A typical student in 
our setting spends many years assigned to the same class of relatively small size. We use data 
from 85 schools in larger towns and cities to analyze the relations between Roma and non-
Roma eighth-grade students in Hungary, a country where anti-Roma sentiments and 
prejudice are widespread. Our friendship data is directly comparable to the data used to 
analyze the friendship relations of students of similar ages in the U.S. (Currarini, Jackson, 
and Pin 2010; Fryer and Torelli 2010; Flashman 2012; Patacchini and Zenou 2015). Besides 
friendship nominations, we also collected information on adversary nominations, enabling us 
to analyze interethnic hostility in a direct way. Our main question is whether high-achieving 
Roma students have more friends and fewer adversaries than low-achieving Roma students, 
both from among their Roma peers and among their non-Roma peers. We measure academic 
achievement by publicly observable grades as well as low-stakes test scores that are 
unobservable to the students. 
 
                                                 
* Fryer and Torelli focus on friendship within the same racial and ethnic group and find that high-
achieving Blacks and, especially, Hispanics have fewer within-group friends than their lower-achieving 
peers. They use “social status” in their main analysis, a measure of reciprocal friendship within groups 
that factors in the within-group friends of friends, etc., but simple measures of friendship lead to the 
same results. Their method is not suited for analyzing inter-group friendship in a direct fashion. 
Importantly, however, they report that high-achieving African American and Hispanic students have 
fewer friends overall (lower “social status” measured using friends in other groups, too), indicating 
that high-achieving minority students do not have more friends from other groups. 
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We find that Roma students with higher academic achievement have significantly more 
friends than Roma students with lower achievement. The difference is driven by having more 
non-Roma friends, while the number of Roma friends is unrelated to the achievement of 
Roma students. These results are monotonic, approximately linear in grade point average, 
and they are remarkably robust to the measure of friendship, controlling for family 
background, grade repetition, school and class fixed-effects, and common support 
restrictions. In line with the literature, we focus on same-sex relationships, but results for 
opposite-sex relationships are very similar. The patterns for hostility show a mirror image, 
also driven by differences in interethnic relations: Higher achieving Roma students are less 
likely to be nominated as adversaries by their non-Roma peers, while hostility from Roma 
peers is not related to their achievement. In general, students have fewer friends and more 
refusals from the other ethnic group, showing significant “inbreeding homophily” (Jackson 
2014). The degree of inbreeding homophily among non-Roma students is lower if members 
of the other ethnic group have high academic achievement. 
Similarly to other studies that examine adolescents in a large number of schools, our 
analysis is correlational. At the same time, the robustness of our results suggests that causal 
effects may be similar. Obviously, the direction of causality is impossible to firmly establish 
with the data at hand, as social interactions may very well affect achievement. We present 
indirect evidence supporting causality from achievement to relations. When publicly 
observed GPA entered together with publicly unobserved test scores the associations with 
test scores is insignificant. The same is not true, however, in regressions with academic 
outcome variables on the left-hand-side such as direction of further studies, dropping out of 
secondary school, or test scores two years later. 
To appreciate the potential consequences of our results, we examine interethnic 
friendship and hostility relations as functions of the ethnic composition of the peer group and 
its interaction with the achievement level of Roma students. We find that while the ethnic 
composition of their peer group is related to the number of friends and adversaries of low-
achieving Roma students, no such association exists for high-achieving Roma students. We 
also find that the exposure of non-Roma students to Roma peers is twice as likely to translate 
into nominating a Roma student as a friend and less likely to translate into nominating a 
Roma student as an adversary if those Roma peers are high-achievers.  
We use these results in a simple simulation exercise to illustrate the potential effects of 
two policies: a complete de-segregation program that equalizes the ethnic distribution of 
classes across the nation and the closing of the ethnic achievement gap. Assuming that our 
results show the effect of class composition and grades on friends, we find that when the two 
policies are combined, the total number of friends and adversaries of Roma students 
improves slightly. At the same time, the ethnic composition of these relationships changes 
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substantially: The overwhelming majority of the within-school friends of Roma students 
become non-Roma, which can enhance their integration into mainstream society. We also 
find that the number of non-Roma students with Roma friends doubles, which can lead to 
lower levels of prejudice in society. With the caveats of large-scale policy conclusions based 
on a partial analysis (Carrell, Sacerdote, and West 2013), these results suggest directions for 
educational policy: Achieving a more equal ethnic distribution and a narrower achievement 
gap may both be needed to combine improvements in the level and ethnic composition of the 
friendship relations of minority students. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we use highly comparable 
data to the studies on middle school and high school students in the U.S., but the 
institutional setup has an important difference. Typical students in our setting spend many 
years with the same classmates in communities of two dozen students. As a result, by the 
time we measure their friendship and hostility relations, students have spent many years 
exposed to the same classmates in relatively intimate communities. Second, we show direct 
evidence regarding hostility as well as friendship, an aspect rarely investigated in the school 
context. Third, we show evidence of the association between academic achievement and 
friendship networks of the Roma minority for the first time. Fourth, using the estimates of 
our analysis together with assumptions on causality, we provide some predictions concerning 
the potential effects of school desegregation and closing the ethnic achievement gap on 
interethnic relations. 
Our results suggest that the fear of rejection due to “acting white” by having higher 
achievement is unlikely to be an issue for most Roma students in Hungarian schools. On the 
contrary, Roma students with higher academic achievement have more non-Roma friends 
and fewer non-Roma adversaries, without having fewer Roma friends and more Roma 
adversaries. This can serve as a strong incentive for Roma students to perform well in school. 
More generally, our results suggest that intensive exposure to high-achieving minority 
students can substantially reduce the social distance majority students keep from minority 
students, even in a society that is characterized by widespread prejudice. These results are in 
line with the classic contact hypothesis in social psychology that postulates exposure is more 
likely to improve intergroup relations if interactions are more personal and status is more 
equal (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Finally, our results suggest 
that it is the difference in the environment not the age difference or the selected nature of 
college students that makes the studies on American college students arrive at conclusions 
that are different from the conclusions of the multi-school studies of younger students. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
The Roma (also known as the Romani people or Gypsies) constitute one of the largest and 
poorest ethnic minorities in Europe. Nearly 80 percent of the Roma live in East-Central 
Europe, from the Czech Republic in the North-West through Bulgaria in the South-East. 
Most Roma live in poverty, with low levels of formal employment and other disadvantages 
(FRA-UNDP 2012). Their low level of education is documented as a major contributor to 
their low employment and low wages (Kertesi and Kézdi 2011a). 
The Roma are the only significant ethnic minority in Hungary, making up about 6 percent 
of the population overall and over 10 percent of the population of eighth-grade students 
(Kemény 2004; Kertesi and Kézdi 2015). Most of the Roma of Hungary speak Hungarian and 
live in neighborhoods that are ethnically mixed, as opposed to segregated settlements 
(Kemény and Janky 2006). The vast majority of Roma students complete all eighth grades of 
elementary school in Hungary, although with a substantial achievement gap. While almost all 
Roma students continue their studies in a secondary school, less than half of them attain a 
secondary degree in the end (Hajdu, Kertesi, and Kézdi 2014). 
Most students complete all eight grades in the same elementary school. The most 
selective secondary schools in the larger cities enroll students earlier, in grades five or seven, 
but they enroll most of their students in Budapest and from a relatively small number of 
elementary schools. As a result, early enrollment in these selective secondary schools has 
little effect on the students of the elementary schools Roma students attend. Ethnic 
segregation of Hungarian schools is moderate on average, but it is high in some areas, and 
approximately half of non-Roma Hungarian children have no Roma peers in elementary 
school (see Kertesi and Kézdi 2014, and the benchmark results of the simulation exercise in 
this paper in section VI). We know relatively little about inter-ethnic relations in Hungarian 
schools; recent studies indicate low levels of inter-ethnic dating (Lorincz, 2015), low levels of 
inter-ethnic friendship, and frequent rejections of Roma students by their non-Roma peers 
(Boda and Néray, 2015). 
Hungarian elementary schools in larger towns and cities, represented by our sample, 
enroll 50 students per grade on average. Some schools are small, with one class per grade, 
while others are larger with two to four classes per grade. Upon enrollment, first graders are 
assigned to a class, and this assignment remains fixed throughout their eight years of studies, 
even in the schools with multiple classes per grade. Class size is below 25 on average. This 
fixed class assignment throughout elementary school results in exposure to the same peers 
for eight years in relatively intimate communities. 
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Prejudice against the Roma is strong and widespread in Hungary. The ethnically largely 
homogeneous majority holds and often expresses high levels of explicit prejudice, and many 
maintain a wide social distance from the Roma. For example, 60 percent of Hungarian adults 
agree with the statement that “the inclination for criminality is in the blood” of the Roma, 
and 40 percent support discriminatory bans of Roma customers from bars serving alcohol 
(Bernát, Juhász, Krekó and Molnár 2013; Székelyi, Csepeli, and Örkény 2001; Váradi 2014).  
II. DATA 
To survey the friendship networks and hostility among Roma and non-Roma students, we 
collected data from 88 elementary schools in the 77 towns and cities with the largest Roma 
populations in Hungary (excluding Budapest, the capital) in April 2010. To ensure adequate 
Roma representation, we oversampled schools with a higher proportion of Roma students 
(the administrative data used for the sampling contained estimates of the proportion of 
Roma students by school but not by grade or class). In each school we surveyed all classes in 
the eighth grade. For our analysis, we retained classes with data on at least 10 students 
(excluding two classes) and valid data on ethnicity and friendships for more than two thirds 
of the students in the class (excluding 25 classes). Our data sample comprises 3,947 students 
from 182 classes in 85 schools. We provide more details on the sampling and the structure of 
the survey in Appendix A. 
Our survey was carried out in classrooms. The first part of the questionnaire asked 
students to nominate friends from their class. In a format identical to the National 
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health of the U.S., we asked respondents to nominate up to 
five of their best male friends and up to five of their best female friends. Then we asked them 
to nominate up to five classmates (female and male combined) with whom they would not 
share a train cabin on a class trip (traditional train cabins host eight people in Hungary; class 
trips by train were familiar to all students). To answer these questions, respondents were 
asked to choose names from a list of all their classmates, including those who were absent on 
the day of the survey. Subsequent parts of the questionnaire asked about friends outside the 
class and school, as well as ethnicity and other background information. Of the 3,947 
students in the classes of the final sample, we have complete information on friend and 
adversary nominations, as well as grades and ethnicity for 3,430 students; they comprise the 
sample of our analysis. The survey data were linked to administrative data on grades and test 
scores. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis.  
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The survey asked two questions on the ethnic identity of the students. As most Roma in 
Hungary have a dualHungarian and Romaidentity,† the wording of the questions invited 
the respondents to identify with two ethnic groups at the same time.‡  Of the 3,430 
respondents in our final sample, 710 (21 percent) identified themselves as Roma in one of the 
two questions (16 percent as primary identification, 5 percent as secondary identification; 
Table O1 in the Online Appendix shows the details). This proportion is higher than a 
representative sample would yield because our survey oversampled schools with a relatively 
high proportion of Roma students.§ While our sample over-represents classes with many 
Roma students, the Roma are still a minority in most classes of our sample (the interquartile 
range is 8 to 30 percent; Figure O1 in the Online Appendix shows the entire distribution). 
We collected student-level information on grades from the class records. These were the 
summary grade point average (GPA) of the first semester, complemented with grades in 
certain subjects. Hungarian schools give summary grades at the end of the first semester as 
well as in the second semester at the end of the school year. The summary grades of the first 
semester of the eighth grade are high stakes as they are part of the scores that determine 
admission to secondary schools. They are also public information: grades are often discussed 
with students in front of the entire class. Grades range from 1 (fail) to 5 (excellent). The 
overall GPA average in our sample is 3.6 (standard deviation 0.9). The average GPA of Roma 
students is substantially lower, equal to the 20th percentile of GPA among non-Roma 
students. Behavior grades, on a scale from 2 to 5, are also part of the regular grading in 
Hungary, reflecting potential behavioral problems in an obviously coarse way (grade 1 would 
result in an immediate expulsion from the school). The Roma average is low, below the 25th 
percentile among non-Roma students.  
We linked the students in our sample to their standardized test scores in reading skills 
and mathematics. The source of this test score data is the May 2010 National Assessment of 
Basic Competencies (NABC), which is a low-stakes assessment administered to all eighth-
grade students in Hungary. In contrast to the GPA and specific grades, test scores are not 
public information; students usually do not know their own test scores. The ethnic test score 
gap in the sample is 0.7 standard deviations in reading and 0.9 standard deviations in 
                                                 
†The Hungarian Census of 2011 allowed identification with two groups (defined as nationalities or 
ethnic groups) for the first time in its history. Of the 3.1 percent of the population with Roma 
identification, 2.5 percentage points also identified themselves as Hungarian. Using longitudinal data 
on adolescents, Simonovits and Kézdi (2015) found that 99 percent of those who identified themselves 
as Roma at some point also identified as Hungarian at some point. 
‡ The exact wording of the two questions was “In our country, people belong to different minorities and 
ethnic groups. To what ethnic group do you consider yourself primarily to belong?” “To what ethnic 
group do you consider yourself to belong secondarily?” 
§ To validate the ethnicity information, we asked teachers to estimate the number of Roma students in 
their classes. The average proportion of Roma students by self-reporting was 21 percent, compared to 
the average proportion of 26 percent according to teachers, with a correlation coefficient of 0.89. 
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mathematics; these are somewhat smaller than the national test score gap measured for 
eighth graders (Kertesi and Kézdi 2011b; Kertesi and Kézdi 2015), reflecting the selected 
nature of our sample. Figures O2 and O3 in the Online Appendix show the distributions of 
GPA and test scores by ethnicity. 
This study focuses on friendship and hostility relations. Our main friendship measure is 
the number of friendship nominations students receive, or the “indegree” of students in 
network science terminology. In line with the literature, we define the peer group as the 
group of classmates of the same sex, but we show that all of our main results are very similar 
with respect to opposite-sex relationships. We measure hostility by the number of adversary 
nominations students receive: the number of peers who listed the student as someone with 
whom they would not want to share a train cabin. We computed nominations from all peers, 
as well as Roma and non-Roma peers separately. For robustness checks, we analyze 
alternative measures of the relations, including the number of peers who nominate the 
students or are nominated by the students, the number of peers who nominate the students 
and are nominated by the students at the same time, and measures that include the 
popularity of the peers. 
The number of peers each student could list was capped at five to make our data 
comparable to the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, the prime source of 
student network data in middle schools and high schools in the U.S. (Fryer and Torelli 2010; 
Currarini, Jackson, and Pin 2012; Flashman 2012; Patacchini and Zenou 2015).  In our data, 
55 percent of the students exhausted the five possibilities for nominating same-sex friends; 
the corresponding figures are 28 percent when nominating opposite-sex friends and 3 
percent when nominating adversaries (see Table O2 in the Online Appendix for more detail). 
The number of nominations students could receive had no explicit cap other than the number 
of peers, but it too is likely affected by the cap on nominations. For a robustness check, we re-
estimated our regressions capping the number of nominations at four and received very 
similar results.  
On average, students received 3.7 friendship nominations and 1.0 refusals from their 
peers. Friendship nominations are distributed relatively symmetrically, whereas adversary 
nominations have a long right tail: most students are not nominated by anyone as an 
adversary and a few are nominated by many. The shapes of the distributions are very similar 
for Roma and non-Roma students. Figures O4 and O5 in the Online Appendix show the 
empirical densities. 
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Table 1.  
Summary statistics 
  All students   Roma Non-Roma 
Variable Mean Std.D. N   Mean Mean 
Roma 0.21 0.41 3430   1.00 0.00 
Number of frienda 3.8 2.0 3430 
 
3.3 3.9 
Number of adversariesa 1.0 1.7 3430   1.3 1.0 
Number of Roma friendsa 0.7 1.1 3430 
 
1.7 0.5 
Number of Roma adversariesa 0.2 0.5 3430   0.2 0.2 
Number of non-Roma friendsa 3.1 2.1 3430 
 
1.6 3.4 
Number of non-Roma adversariesa 0.8 1.6 3430   1.0 0.8 
GPA b 3.6 0.9 3430 
 
2.9 3.8 
Mathematics grade b 3.1 1.2 3404 
 
2.4 3.3 
Hungarian grade b 3.5 1.1 3427 
 
2.8 3.7 
Behavior grade b 4.1 0.9 3427 
 
3.5 4.3 
Standardized test score in mathematics c -0.3 1.0 3154 
 
-0.8 -0.1 
Standardized test score in reading c 0.0 1.0 3154 
 
-0.6 0.1 
Level of mathematic abilities d 1.4 1.0 3148 
 
0.9 1.5 
Level of reading abilities d 2.3 1.1 3148   1.7 2.4 
Repeated grade in past 0.10 0.30 3430   0.23 0.07 
Age 14 years 0.20 0.40 3430 
 
0.14 0.22 
Age 15 years 0.68 0.47 3430 
 
0.62 0.70 
Age 16 years 0.09 0.29 3430 
 
0.18 0.07 
Age 17 years or more 0.03 0.16 3430   0.06 0.02 
Number of years in pre-school 3.15 0.84 3426   2.77 3.25 
Mother's education less than 8 grades 0.04 0.19 3430 
 
0.13 0.01 
Mother's education 8 grades 0.25 0.43 3430 
 
0.55 0.17 
Mother's education vocational secondary school 0.32 0.47 3430 
 
0.24 0.34 
Mother's education high school 0.27 0.44 3430 
 
0.06 0.33 
Mother's education college or more 0.12 0.32 3430 
 
0.02 0.14 
Mother's education missing 0.00 0.05 3430   0.00 0.00 
Fraction Roma in class (from student survey) 0.21 0.20 3430 
 
0.40 0.16 
Fraction Roma in class (teacher assessment) 0.25 0.22 3282 
 
0.44 0.20 
Size of peer group (same-sex classmates) 11.9 3.3 3430 
 
11.3 12.1 
a Nominations received from same-sex classmates 
b from 1 (fail) to 5 (excellent) 
c Standardized at the national level (mean 0, standard deviation 1) 
d from 0 (inadequate) to 4 (excellent) 
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The average age in the sample is 15 years; 10 percent repeated a grade in the past (30 
percent of Roma students and 7 percent of non-Roma students). Students spent over three 
years on average in preschool (state-subsidized preschool is available in Hungary from age 
three); the non-Roma average is somewhat higher, and the Roma average is 2.8. The mothers 
of Roma students have substantially lower levels of education. Table 1 shows the summary 
statistics of the variables in our analysis. It shows the mean, standard deviation and number 
of observations for the entire sample and the mean values by ethnicity. 
We use two other data sources in a simulation exercise that illustrates the potential policy 
consequences of the results of our analysis. The first data source is the National Assessment 
of Basic Competencies (NABC), the source of the test score data presented above. This is an 
administrative data set that also contains some school-level information, including 
principals’ estimates of the ethnic composition of the student body in their schools. The other 
data source is the Hungarian Life Course Survey (HLCS), a nationally representative survey 
of 10,000 adolescents with linked records from the NABC. In contrast to the individual-level 
test score data, the HLCS has ethnic markers that are of high quality (for more details on the 
HLCS data, see Kertesi and Kézdi 2011b and Simonovits and Kézdi 2015). 
III. FRIENDSHIP AND HOSTILITY BY ETHNICITY AND ACADEMIC 
ACHIEVEMENT 
The main question of our analysis is how the number of friends and adversaries is related to 
academic achievement. Beyond the total numbers, we are interested in the ethnic 
composition of these relationships. In our baseline analysis we investigate relationships with 
GPA, and we examine alternative measures of academic achievement as extensions. 
First we show nonparametric regression results. We created categories of GPA using 
increments of 0.5, and estimated the mean number of friends and adversaries in those 
categories separately for Roma students and non-Roma students. To make the interpretation 
simple, we normalized the number of friends and adversaries to have a zero mean by 
subtracting their average numbers within each class. Figure 1 shows the results for the total 
number of friends and adversaries. 
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Figure 1. 
Number of friends and adversaries and GPA (grade point average)  
The average number of same-sex nominations received by Roma and non-Roma 
students, normalized to average nominations in the class to be zero. Estimated 
averages by GPA category and 95% confidence intervals 
-2
-1
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2
2 3 4 5
GPA
95% CI Roma students
95% CI Non-Roma students
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GPA
95% CI Roma students
95% CI Non-Roma students
 
A. Friendship nominations & GPA B. Adversary nominations & GPA 
 
Panel A of Figure 1 shows that students with higher GPA have more friends, whether they 
are Roma or non-Roma. Panel B shows the mirror image of that pattern: students with 
higher GPA have fewer adversaries, again regardless of their ethnicity. The two graphs show 
approximately linear relationships of opposite signs and similar magnitudes. The Roma and 
non-Roma lines have similar levels, and the slopes are possibly steeper for the Roma. 
The positive association of GPA with the number of friends and its negative association 
with the number of adversaries both come from non-Roma students. Whether Roma students 
nominate others as friends or adversaries is largely unrelated to the other students’ GPA. 
Figure 2 shows the associations according to the ethnicity of the friends and adversaries. 
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Figure 2. 
The number of Roma and non-Roma friends and adversaries by GPA. 
The average number of same-sex nominations received by Roma and non-Roma 
students from each ethnic group, normalized by average nominations from the 
respective ethnic group in the class. Estimated averages by GPA category and 
95% confidence intervals 
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We estimate linear regressions to assess the magnitudes of the associations and their 
robustness. We examine the six left-hand side variables that are shown in Figures 1 and 2: the 
total number of friends and adversaries, and the number of Roma and non-Roma friends and 
adversaries. We denote the generic left-hand side variable as rn , where n is the number of 
nominations and superscript r means that these are nominations received by the individual. 
We estimate the following regression for each of the six left-hand side variables: 
 1 2 3
r
cgi c cgi cgi cgi cgi cgin GPA GPA Roma Roma u           (1) 
where index c is class, g is gender group (male or female), and i is student. Coefficients 
c   are class fixed effects; cgiGPA  is the grade point average of student i in gender group g in 
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class c, normalized so that 0 represents the approximate average in the sample (3.5); cgiRoma  
is whether the student is Roma. Students in different classes may develop differential 
attitudes to their peers and the academic achievement of those peers due, for example, to 
differences in the composition of their class, the differential anchoring of their grades, or 
differences in the teachers or the school environment they experience. The class fixed effects 
eliminate the effect of such differences on the estimated friendship–GPA relations to the 
extent that they affect all students in a class in similar ways. As robustness checks, we 
estimate regressions with class–gender fixed effects cg  instead of the class fixed effects c   
and obtain very similar results. Standard errors are clustered at the class level, taking care of 
remaining within-class correlations – thus, for example, the potential negative correlation of 
nominations due to the adding-up constraint in their number.  
The coefficients of main interest are 1   and 2 . 1   shows the difference in the average 
number of friendship or adversary nominations by two non-Roma students in the same class 
with a unit difference in GPA. 2   shows the extent to which this is different for Roma 
students so that 1 2   shows the difference in the nominations received by two Roma 
students in the same class who have different GPA scores. If 1  and 2   have the same sign, 
the relationship is of the same direction but stronger for Roma students. Coefficient 3   
shows the extent to which Roma students receive more nominations than non-Roma 
students if both have a GPA of 3.5 (the approximate mean in the sample). The results of 
regression (1) are shown in Table 2.  
Table 2.  
Friends and adversaries by ethnicity and GPA of the nominated student. 
Dependent variable: 
nominations received from 
peers 
(1) 
Friends  
(2) 
Adversaries 
 (3) 
Friends 
(4) 
Adversaries 
 (5) 
Friends 
(6) 
Adversaries 
   From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.57 -0.44  -0.11 -0.02  0.67 -0.42 
 (0.06)** (0.05)**  (0.02)** (0.01)  (0.05)** (0.05)** 
Roma × GPA 0.14 -0.27  0.13 -0.06  0.01 -0.21 
 (0.12) (0.11)*  (0.08) (0.04)  (0.11) (0.10)* 
Roma -0.15 0.10  0.46 -0.15  -0.61 0.25 
 (0.12) (0.10)  (0.10)** (0.05)**  (0.12)** (0.08)** 
Class FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes. The number of friendship and adversary nominations from all peers, as well as from Roma and 
non-Roma peers separately, as functions of GPA and ethnicity of the student. Peers are same-sex 
classmates. GPA is publicly observable grade point average ranging from 1 to 5, normalized to be zero 
at its mean value 3.5. 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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The results are in line with the conclusions of Figures 1 and 2. According to columns 1 and 
2, non-Roma students with a one point higher GPA receive 0.6 more friendship nominations 
and 0.4 fewer adversary nominations on average from their peers ( 1 in columns 1 and 2). 
Roma students with a one point higher GPA receive 0.7 more friendship nominations and 0.7 
fewer adversary nominations on average from their peers ( 1 2   in columns 1 and 2). The 
association with GPA is statistically significantly stronger among Roma students than non-
Roma students in terms of adversaries but not in terms of friends. 
Columns 3 to 6 show that the relationships observed are almost exclusively due to 
differential nominations from non-Roma peers, again in line with the conclusions of Figures 
1 and 2. Roma students with different GPA have the same number of Roma friends and 
adversaries on average ( 1 2   in columns 3 and 4). In contrast, their relations with non-
Roma peers are strongly related to their GPA: Roma students with a one point higher GPA 
have 0.7 more non-Roma friends and 0.6 fewer non-Roma adversaries on average ( 1 2   in 
columns 3 and 4). The friendship relationships among the non-Roma students are similarly 
related to their GPA, but the adversary relationship are less strongly related to GPA (0.4 
fewer non-Roma adversaries of non-Roma students if their GPA is higher by one point).  
The coefficients on the Roma variable ( 3 ) reveal the average differences in the 
nominations received by Roma students versus non-Roma students with the same GPA, fixed 
at 3.5. Note that while 3.5 is the approximate average and median GPA overall, it is the 40th 
percentile among non-Roma students but the 80th percentile among Roma students. Roma 
and non-Roma students with a GPA of 3.5 have approximately the same number of friends 
and adversaries overall ( 3  in columns 1 and 2), but the composition differs by ethnicity: 
approximately 0.5 more friends and 0.2 fewer adversaries from the same ethnic group than 
from the opposite ethnic group (the differences in 3  between columns 3 vs. 5 and 4 vs. 6 are 
statistically not significant). These results suggest a bias toward favoring peers from one’s 
own ethnic group over peers from the other ethnic group, a phenomenon known as 
inbreeding homophily in network science. In relation to peers with a GPA of 3.5, the bias is 
similar in the two ethnic groups. At the same time, GPA and nominations are related, and 
this relationship differs for Roma and non-Roma students. As a result, the magnitude of the 
ethnic bias differs in relation to peers with different levels of achievement. 
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IV. ROBUSTNESS AND INDIRECT EVIDENCE ON CAUSALITY 
The results presented in the previous section are remarkably robust in many different 
specifications: leaving out the class fixed effects, including class–gender fixed effects instead 
of class fixed effects, restricting the sample to those who have not repeated grades, restricting 
the sample to the common support in ethnic composition (two or more same-sex classmates 
in both ethnic groups), and the inclusion of covariates (grade retention, age, gender, parental 
education, and number of years spent in preschool). Tables O3 to O13 in the Online Appendix 
show the estimates of these alternative specifications. The results also appear robust to the 
cap on nominations in the data: we obtain very similar estimates if we impose a cap of four 
names instead of five.  
Our estimates remain similar if we use alternative measures of the relationships. We 
consider four such measures: received nominations weighted by the nominations of those 
peers; the number of peers that are nominated by the student or nominate the student; the 
number of peers that are nominated by the student and nominate the student; the popularity 
measure developed by Echenique and Fryer (2007), and used by Fryer and Torelli (2010) to 
analyze interethnic and interracial relationships in the U.S. Again, the results are 
qualitatively unchanged.  
When we replace nominations from same-sex classmates with nominations from 
opposite-sex classmates as the left-hand side variables, the results are again very similar, 
whether we look at friendship nominations received, originated, or reciprocal ones (Tables 
O14 through O16 in the Online Appendix). 
The association of friends and adversaries with GPA are the same for students who 
identified as Roma in the 1st place and those who identified as Roma in the 2nd place even 
though the ethnic composition of their friends and adversaries differ if GPA is controlled 
(Table O17). There is some heterogeneity by gender: the associations with GPA are somewhat 
stronger for male Roma students than for female Roma students, and the difference is the 
opposite among non-Roma students (Tables O18 and O19).  
The association of GPA with friends and adversaries of Roma students is related to the 
average GPA of their peer group, but this difference is small. One unit higher GPA is 
associated with one more non-Roma friend for Roma students in peer groups with high 
average GPA, compared to 0.8 more friends in peer groups with low average GPA. 
Conversely, one unit higher GPA is associated with 0.75 fewer non-Roma adversaries for 
Roma students in peer groups with high average GPA, compared to 0.6 fewer adversaries in 
peer groups with low average GPA. These differences are inconsistent with a “substitution” of 
low-GPA same-ethnicity friends with opposite-ethnicity high-GPA friends among non-Roma 
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students. Tables O20 and O21 show our estimates separately for the top and the bottom half 
of the distribution of peer groups by their average GPA. 
There is substantial heterogeneity in the level of prejudice across the towns in our sample, 
measured by the fraction of votes casted on the far right party Jobbik with explicit anti-Roma 
platform in the general elections of 2010, within a month from our data collection (9% to 
40%). Perhaps surprisingly, that heterogeneity does not appear to affect our results: there are 
no significant differences between towns of different prejudice levels (tables O21 and O21 
show the estimates separately for the lower and upper part of the prejudice distribution). 
When we estimate our regressions replacing the Roma interaction with an interaction with 
low social status and restrict the analysis to the subsample of non-Roma students we see no 
significant difference by social status neither in the slope coefficients on GPA nor the level 
(low status is measured by whether the mother has 8 grades of education or less; 18% of non-
Roma students have such mothers, compared to 70% of Roma students in the total sample). 
This result (shown in table O23) suggests that the preferences for own-ethnicity friends that 
we documented earlier reveal ethnic preferences as opposed to simply preferences for 
students with similar social status. 
The robustness of the association of GPA with friendship and hostility relations is 
remarkable. It suggests that causal effects may be similar. However, they are not informative 
on the direction of causality. To get some indirect evidence on the direction of causality we 
enter GPA together with scores from low-stakes tests in our regressions. As we indicated in 
the Data section above, GPA is publicly observable in Hungarian schools as grades are 
typically discussed in front of the whole class, while test scores are publicly, and often 
privately, unobserved. If causality runs from social relations to performance we would expect 
them to show up in both measures of achievement, resulting in nonzero coefficients for both. 
In contrast, if causality runs from achievement to relations public observability is likely to be 
important, and we would expect the coefficients on GPA to be the same as before while the 
coefficients on test scores to be zero. Our results are exactly these latter ones: when both are 
entered the coefficient on GPA retains its original magnitude while the coefficient on test 
scores is statistically zero in all regressions (table O24 in the Appendix). While in principle 
this may simply reflect that test scores are too noisy to contain any information conditional 
on GPA, we show that that is unlikely to be the case. We examine analogous regressions with 
subsequent outcome measures on the left-hand-side: admission to academic secondary 
school, dropping out of secondary school, GPA and test scores in grade 10 (table O25 in the 
Appendix). Test scores are statistically significant in all of these regressions, with coefficient 
magnitudes ranging from one quarter of that of GPA (admission, dropping out, GPA) to three 
times as large (future test scores).  
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Taken together, our result indicate that Roma students can gain more non-Roma friends 
without losing Roma friends if they perform better in school, and they can decrease hostility 
by non-Roma students without inducing hostility by their Roma peers. These results 
contradict the notion of the detrimental effects of “acting white” in the context of Hungarian 
schools. Instead of being punished for their better achievement, eighth-grade Roma students 
in Hungary are rewarded by the majority ethnic group and keep their social status in their 
own ethnic group at the same time. 
In the next sections, we explore the consequences of these findings for the association of 
the composition of students’ peer groups and interethnic relations. We are interested in the 
following two sets of questions. First, how do the number and ethnic composition of the 
friends and adversaries of Roma students vary with the ethnic composition of their peer 
group? And how is this association different for high- and low-achieving Roma students? 
Second, how does the number of non-Roma students who nominate Roma students as 
friends and adversaries vary with the ethnic composition of their peer group? And how 
different are these associations if the Roma students in the peer group have high 
achievement? The answers to these questions can inform educational policy about the 
potential effects of ethnic desegregation and the closing of the achievement gap on the 
interethnic friendship and hostility relations in schools. To quantify the potential effects, we 
carry out a simulation exercise using our results, calibrated to the ethnic and achievement 
distribution of the population of eighth-grade students in Hungary. 
V. FRIENDS AND ADVERSARIES OF ROMA STUDENTS AND THE ETHNIC 
COMPOSITION OF THEIR PEER GROUPS 
Our results on the ethnic biases in the friendship and hostility relationships suggest that 
Roma students have more friends and fewer adversaries if a higher proportion of their peer 
group is Roma. We have also shown that the degree of ethnic bias of non-Roma students is 
stronger towards low-achieving Roma students than toward high-achieving Roma students. 
As a result, the ethnic composition of the peer group is likely to have a weaker association 
with the number of friends and adversaries for high-achieving Roma students than for low-
achieving Roma students. In this section, we explore the magnitude of these relationships 
and pay special attention to potential nonlinearities. 
Figure 3 shows the non-parametric regression results with the average number of friends 
and adversaries of high-achieving Roma students and low-achieving Roma students as the 
function of the proportion of Roma students in their peer group. We define high achievement 
as having a GPA of 3.5; 60 percent of the non-Roma students are high achievers, compared to 
20 percent of Roma students. Similarly to the previous section, friends and adversaries are 
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defined as nominations received from same-sex classmates. The proportion of Roma students 
in the peer group of Roma students is aggregated to categories, and this proportion does 
include the Roma student himself or herself. 
Figure 3 
Friends and adversaries of Roma students and the ethnic composition of their 
peer groups 
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If nobody in their peer group is Roma, high-achieving Roma students have 4 friends and 1 
adversary on average (using rounded estimates), while low-achieving Roma students have 2 
friends and 2 adversaries on average. If, instead, half of their peer group is Roma, high-
achieving Roma students have the same number of friends and only slightly fewer 
adversaries on average (4 and 0.8), while low-achieving Roma students have significantly 
more friends and fewer adversaries (3 and 1.2). 
Tables O26 and O27 in the Online Appendix show the corresponding regressions where 
the nonlinearities are captured by quadratic terms. These are results with and without 
individual covariates, as well as with and without class fixed-effects are very similar. The 
coefficients in the regressions with class fixed-effects are identified from within-class 
differences in the ethnic composition of girls versus boys, as peer groups are defined by 
gender. They show the extent to which the number of friends and adversaries differ if the 
composition of the peer group differs within the same class. These results therefore control 
for all observed and unobserved differences between classes that may affect relationships and 
the composition of peer groups at the same time, such as ability tracking or preferences of 
parents or teachers for ethnic mixing. Figure O6 in the Online Appendix shows that the 
associations are very similar if the number of potential nominations is capped at four.  
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Figure O7 in the Online Appendix shows the corresponding nonparametric regressions 
for opposite-sex relations. The association of opposite-sex friendships with the ethnic 
composition of opposite-sex classmates is weak both for high-achieving Roma students and 
low-achieving Roma students, while the results for opposite-sex hostilities are very similar to 
those for same-sex hostilities. Figures O8 and O9 (Online Appendix) show the relationships 
with the number of Roma and non-Roma friends and adversaries separately. The average 
number of Roma friends increases strongly with the proportion of Roma students in the peer 
group, while the number of Roma adversaries increases only a little and stays very close to 
zero. Importantly, both of these associations are the same for high- and low-achieving Roma 
students. In contrast, the association between the proportion of Roma peers and the number 
of non-Roma friends is stronger for high-achieving Roma students, while association with the 
number of non-Roma adversaries is weaker for them. The differential results for the total 
number of friends and adversaries are driven by the differential results for non-Roma friends 
and adversaries. 
The robustness of these results gives support to a causal interpretation of the 
associations. Reducing the proportion of Roma students in the peer group would decrease the 
number of Roma friends. At the same time, it would increase the number of non-Roma 
friends. This substitution is substantially stronger for high-achieving Roma students: they 
would lose the same number of Roma friends as low-achieving Roma students, but they 
would gain more non-Roma friends. As a result, decreasing the proportion of Roma students 
in the peer groups of Roma students is expected to result in low-achieving Roma students 
having fewer friends and more adversaries, but it is not expected to change the overall 
number of friends and adversaries of high-achieving Roma students. Therefore, a 
desegregation policy reducing the proportion of Roma students in the peer group would for 
most Roma students shift the ethnic composition of their friends and adversaries to 
encompass more non-Roma students. It also has the potential to have a detrimental effect on 
the friendship relations of low-achieving Roma students but not of high-achieving Roma 
students. Before we quantify these potential effects in a simulation exercise, we turn to our 
second set of questions: the association of peer group composition with the propensity of 
non-Roma students to nominate Roma students as friends or adversaries. 
VI. ROMA FRIENDS AND ADVERSARIES OF NON-ROMA STUDENTS AND THE 
ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THEIR PEER GROUPS 
Whether or not students from the majority have friends and adversaries from a 
disadvantaged ethnic minority can have long-lasting effects on their prejudice and anti-
minority sentiments. In this section, we look at the likelihood of non-Roma students 
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nominating Roma peers as a function of the composition of their peer group by ethnicity and 
achievement. A mechanical relationship should lead to more non-Roma students having 
Roma friends and adversaries if a larger proportion of their peer group is Roma. Our 
previous results imply that the achievement of these Roma peers should also matter: the 
higher the achievement of the Roma peers, the more non-Roma students would nominate 
some of them as friends and the fewer non-Roma students would nominate some of them as 
adversaries. We explore the magnitude and potential nonlinearities in these associations. 
Figure 4 
The percentage of non-Roma students nominating Roma students  
as a friend and as an adversary  
(as a function of the proportion of low-achieving Roma students and the proportion of high-
GPA Roma students in the peer group; both of these proportions are aggregated to 
categories; variance of the estimates computed as p(1-p)/#schools) 
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 The left panel of Figure 4 shows the percentage of non-Roma students who nominate 
at least one Roma student as a friend as a function of the proportion of low-achieving Roma 
students in her or his peer group, and separately as a function of the proportion of high-
achieving Roma students (the achievement cutoff is a GPA of 3.5, as before). The right panel 
shows the corresponding figures for whether non-Roma students nominate a Roma student 
as an adversary. The figures are created by aggregating the data to categories of the 
proportion of low-achieving and high-achieving Roma students, and the domain of the latter 
is narrower and does not go above 50 percent.  
Non-Roma students are more likely to nominate at least one Roma student as friend if a 
greater proportion of their peers is Roma. The slope of the regression line is significantly 
higher with respect to the proportion of high-achieving Roma students among their peers. 
When the proportion of low-achieving Roma students is between 0 and 10 percent, 
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approximately 10 percent of the non-Roma students have Roma friends; when the same 
proportion is 30 to 40 percent, 40 percent of them have Roma friends. When the proportion 
of high-achieving Roma students is between 0 and 10 percent, 15 percent of the non-Roma 
students have Roma friends; when the same proportion is 30 to 40 percent, 80 percent of 
them have Roma friends. The likelihood that non-Roma students nominate Roma 
adversaries is a positive function of the proportion of low-achieving Roma students in the 
peer group below 30 percent and levels off beyond that. The corresponding association with 
the proportion of high-achieving Roma students does not show a clear increasing pattern. 
Note that the proportion of non-Roma students with a Roma adversary is higher when the 
proportion of high-achieving Roma students is below 10 percent than when the proportion of 
low-achieving Roma students is below 10 percent. This difference is small, statistically not 
significant, and it runs counter to our earlier robust finding of high-achieving Roma students 
receiving fewer adversary nominations from their non-Roma peers than low-achieving Roma 
students. Nevertheless, this statistically not significant difference will have a counterintuitive 
effect in our simulation exercise, predicting a slight increase in the number of non-Roma 
students who nominate Roma adversaries if Roma students have higher achievement, 
because most non-Roma students have Roma peers. Figure O10 in the Online Appendix 
shows that the estimated associations are essentially the same when the number of 
nominations is capped at 4. Figure O11 shows that there is virtually no difference in the 
likelihood of nominating an opposite-sex Roma student as a friend or an adversary based on 
the achievement level of the group. 
We estimate linear probability models to assess the robustness of the associations of our 
figures. The regressions include the proportion of low-achieving Roma students in the peer 
group together with the proportion of high-achieving Roma students in the peer group, both 
in a quadratic specification. Table O28 in the Online Appendix shows the results. Similar to 
the nonparametric results, the association between the probability of nominating a Roma 
friend and the proportion of low-achieving Roma students in the peer group is strong and 
positive. The probability of nominating a Roma adversary shows a similar relationship, which 
starts out stronger but levels off when the proportion is 50 percent and gets close to zero 
again when it is 100 percent. Conditional on the proportion of low-achieving Roma students, 
the proportion of high-achieving Roma students increases the probability more than twofold 
at low proportions, and the additional association diminishes at higher proportions. The 
results for nominating a Roma adversary are a mirror image to these findings, but there is no 
association with the proportion of high-achieving Roma students. Remarkably, the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) and the class fixed effects results are very similar. The only difference 
between the OLS and the fixed effects results is that the additional association with the 
exposure to high-achieving Roma students diminishes less in the latter results. 
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Our results lead to conclusions that are similar to those obtained by Carrell, Hoekstra, 
and West (2015). They find that when white students in the U.S. Air Force Academy spend a 
year with high-achieving African American students in the same squadron (based on random 
assignment), they are more likely to choose an African American student as a roommate in 
the following year than if they spent that year with lower-achieving African American 
students. Hence, students from an otherwise prejudiced majority appear to reduce their 
social distance from a disadvantaged racial or ethnic minority if they are exposed to high-
achieving members of the minority for a long time in a relatively intimate setting.  
VII. POLICY SIMULATIONS 
We use the results from the previous sections to simulate the effects of two policy 
experiments. The first experiment is complete ethnic desegregation: achieving uniform 
ethnic distribution across classes in the entire country. The second experiment is closing the 
achievement gap: increasing the proportion of high-achieving Roma students to the non-
Roma level. We are interested in how the two experiments separately, or combined, affect the 
number and ethnic composition of friends and adversaries of Roma students, and how they 
affect the likelihood that non-Roma students nominate at least one Roma student as a friend 
or an adversary. These experiments represent extreme outcomes of policies that aim at 
increasing inter-ethnic exposure in schools and improving academic achievement of 
disadvantaged students. 
The details of the simulation exercise are presented in Appendix B. First, we make use of 
various additional data sources to simulate the national distribution of eighth-grade classes 
by gender, ethnicity, and achievement. Second, we estimate the expected number of friends 
and adversaries in each class–gender–ethnicity group using the simulated distribution and 
our estimates from the previous two sections. These class–gender–ethnicity level estimates 
are then used to estimate national averages for the number of friends and adversaries by 
ethnicity. Finally, we repeat the exercise for the two hypothetical changes in the distribution: 
equal ethnic distribution and an increased proportion of high-achieving students among 
Roma students to the non-Roma level. Importantly, we pay attention to indivisibility issues 
and the fact that with only a few Roma students in a class, their distribution across same-
gender peer groups is not necessarily the same. 
The simulated national distributions suggest that 46 percent of non-Roma students and 
37 percent of Roma students have zero Roma in their peer group. The majority of the peer 
group is Roma for only 2 percent of the non-Roma students and 13 percent of the Roma 
students. Equalized distribution of Roma students across classes leads to only 27 percent of 
non-Roma students and 69 percent of Roma students having zero Roma in their peer group. 
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Table 3 shows the simulated effects of the policy changes on the number of friends and 
adversaries of an average Roma student.  
Table 3.  
Friends and adversaries of Roma students: the simulated effect  
of equal ethnic distribution and closing the achievement gap 
  The number of 
  Friends Adversaries   
Roma 
Friends 
Roma 
Adversaries 
  
Non-Roma 
Friends 
Non-Roma 
Adversaries 
Benchmark estimates for an average Roma student 
Number of friends and 
adversaries 
3.1 1.4 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
2.1 1.3 
Simulated change under alternative scenarios 
Effect of equalized 
distribution 
-0.3 0.3 
 
-0.8 -0.1 
 
0.5 0.4 
Effect of closing the 
achievement gap 
0.4 -0.3 
 
0.0 0.0 
 
0.4 -0.3 
Effect of both 0.2 -0.1   -0.8 -0.1   1.0 0.0 
Notes. Results of the simulation exercise; see details in Appendix B. 
 
At baseline, Roma students have 3.1 friends and 1.4 adversaries on average, constituted 
by having 1 Roma friend, 2.1 non-Roma friends, 0.1 Roma adversaries, and 1.3 non-Roma 
adversaries. The effects of an equalized ethnic distribution would be negative on the total 
numbers: 0.3 fewer friends and 0.3 more adversaries. These are the results of 0.8 fewer 
Roma friends not fully compensated by the increased number of non-Roma friends, and 0.4 
more non-Roma adversaries not fully compensated by the decreased number of Roma 
adversaries. In contrast, closing the achievement gap would result in positive effects only: 0.4 
more friends and 0.3 fewer adversaries, resulting from no changes in the relations with Roma 
peers and improved relations with non-Roma peers. When the two policies are combined, the 
effects of closing the achievement gap would dominate for the total numbers, but this would 
be accompanied by a substantial redistribution of the ethnic composition of friends and 
adversaries due to equalized exposure to the other ethnic group. 
Table 4 shows that under the current distributions, 18 percent of the non-Roma students 
have at least one Roma friend and 14 percent have at least one Roma adversary. Equal ethnic 
distribution leads to an increase in both, but a substantially larger increase in those with a 
Roma friend, to 26 and 15 percent, respectively. Closing the achievement gap in itself leads to 
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a similar increase in the percentage of non-Roma students with a Roma friend, to 25 percent, 
and a substantial decrease in those with a Roma adversary, to 5 percent. The two policies 
combined would result in a striking increase in friendship nomination and a small decrease 
in adversary nomination, to 32 and 10 percent, respectively. 
Table 4.  
The percentage of non-Roma students with at least  
one Roma friend or adversary 
  Percentage who have at least one 
  Roma friend Roma adversary 
Benchmark estimates 18 14 
Simulated change under alternative scenarios 
Effect of equal distribution 26 15 
Effect of closing the achievement gap 25 5 
Effect of both 32 10 
Notes. Results of the simulation exercise; friends and adversaries are 
defined as nominations extended by non-Roma students. See details in 
Appendix B. 
 
The results of the simulation exercise suggest that equalizing the ethnic distribution of 
classes would lead to a major interethnic redistribution of the friendship and hostility 
relations of Roma students. It would also lead to a moderate deterioration in their situation 
in terms of overall number of friends and adversaries. The increase in the proportion of non-
Roma students having a Roma friend is moderate, but it comes at the cost of a slight increase 
in the proportion having a Roma adversary. Closing the achievement gap would lead to an 
improvement in the friendship and adversary relations of Roma students without major 
shifts in their ethnic composition. It would also lead to an increase in the percentage of non-
Roma students with Roma friends and a decrease in the number having Roma adversaries.  
When equalizing the ethnic distribution is combined with closing the achievement gap, 
the relations of Roma students show improvements together with major shifts in the ethnic 
composition of their friends and adversaries. In addition, the proportion of non-Roma 
students with a Roma friend would increase compared to the baseline percentage, and the 
percentage with a Roma adversary would decrease. The magnitudes implied by our 
simulation exercise are significant. For example, when combined, the policies considered 
have the potential to increase the number of non-Roma students with Roma friends by 80 
percent, although they would still be a minority among all non-Roma students (32 percent). 
The same combination of policies can lead to even more substantial shifts in the ethnic 
composition of friends of Roma students.  
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Of course, the actual effects of large policy changes may be very different from our 
simulation results. The changes may lead to interethnic dynamics that undermine some or 
even most of the positive effects, similar Carrell, Sacerdote, and West’s (2013) findings in 
their policy experiment. Alternatively, these policies may contribute to lowering the overall 
level of prejudice, which could have additional positive effects. Nevertheless, our results 
suggest that educational policies can improve interethnic relations if they achieve both a 
more equal ethnic distribution across classes and a narrower achievement gap between 
minority and majority students. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper provides strong evidence that high-achieving eighth-grade students from the 
disadvantaged Roma minority in Hungary have significantly more friends and fewer 
adversaries than low-achieving ones. The relationship is monotone and remarkably robust 
across a wide range of specifications, providing support for a causal interpretation. The 
association is very similar for same-sex friendships and opposite-sex friendships, it is 
strongest for publicly observable academic achievement, and the association between 
achievement and the number of adversaries is a mirror image of the findings for friendship 
relations. These associations are, if anything, stronger for Roma students than non-Roma 
students, and they are driven by relationships with their non-Roma peers. Roma–Roma 
relations are not significantly related to academic achievement. 
 Instead of reducing the social status of Roma students as postulated by the “acting 
white” hypothesis, high academic achievement increases their social status in general, 
without decreasing their status among their minority peers. This is a remarkable finding 
given the generally strong and open anti-Roma sentiments in general. It also seems to be at 
odds with findings from studies on African American and Hispanic minorities of similar age 
in the U.S. using comparable data and methodology (Fryer and Torelli, 2010). At the same 
time, it is in line with   findings on the effects of exposure to roommates and military 
squadrons of college students in the U.S. We speculate that it is the institutional framework 
of social interactionmore similar to the roommate and military squadron assignments than 
class assignments in U.S. middle schools and high schoolsthat can explain the difference. 
Similarly to most countries in Europe, students in Hungarian schools are assigned to the 
same class throughout their school career, leading to intensive exposure to their classmates 
in relatively intimate communities for many years. Perhaps such an environment is more 
conductive to fostering peer appreciation of the high academic achievement of disadvantaged 
students. 
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Our finding has important implications for social policysimilarly, with an opposite sign, 
to the potential importance of the “acting white” phenomenon that is refuted in our context. 
Minority students can benefit from working harder in schools, not only in the long term but 
also in the short term. Learning environments that help minority students achieve higher 
academic results also foster their social wellbeing and integration right away. Educational 
policy can leverage this extra incentive when aiming to close the achievement gap between 
minorities and the majority. Indeed, our simulation results suggest that a policy that 
combines desegregation and closing the achievement gap can improve the social relations of 
minority students both in terms of having more friends and having more of their friends from 
the majority. While desegregation, in itself, increases the hostility they face, also closing the 
achievement gap would counter-balance that, leading to better social status along all 
dimensions. This combined policy has the highest potential to result in more of the majority 
students having minority friends. 
Tensions along ethnic and racial lines have been strong in many countries, and may have 
become stronger in recent years. The social integration of disadvantaged minorities is as 
important a social goal as ever: it improves the lives of minorities and reduces social tensions 
at the same time. Our finding suggests that ethnic diversity in classrooms and educational 
practices that help the academic development of minority students promote this goal if 
students are exposed to each other for substantial time in relatively intimate communities. 
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APPENDIX A: DATA DOCUMENTATION 
 
The data for our analysis comes from the “Interetnikus kapcsolatok” (Inter-ethnic relations) 
survey. The survey was designed by the authors of this paper and it was financed by the 
Educatio Kht, Hungary. The data was collected by the Adatgyujto Intezet, Hungary, in the 
spring of 2010. 
 
The target population of the survey was the eighth grade students in the towns and cities of 
Hungary who studied in schools with at least 10 percent and at most 90 percent Roma 
students. The sampling frame was selected from the set of schools in the National 
Assessment of Basic Competencies, the nationwide student testing framework that includes 
administrative data on schools as well. Among other information, this data contains school 
principals’ estimates of the proportion of Roma students in their schools. We used the 
average of this information from 2006, 2007 and 2008 to select the schools in the 10 percent 
to 90 percent range. The final sampling frame consisted of 354 schools that were located in 
towns and cities (except Budapest) so we excluded all village schools.  
 
The sample was stratified random sample of 88 schools in 74 towns and cities. The strata 
were based on the proportion of Roma students and the schools’ participation in an 
integrated education framework program implemented by the Hungarian government (“IPR 
program”); this latter information was not used in our analysis. The geographic distribution 
of the sample was not restricted or stratified. As there were few schools with high proportion 
of Roma students we used higher sampling weights for such schools to obtain more even 
distribution in the sample. Figure A1 shows the histogram of the proportion of Roma 
students; panel A shows the distribution in the sampling frame, while panel B shows the 
distribution in the sample. 
 
All students in grade 8 in the 88 selected schools were part of the data collection. The data 
was collected in classrooms. The main instrument was a student questionnaire with the lists 
of friends and adversaries and some background information. The names of all students in 
the class were written on the blackboard, and students were asked to list the names of their 
five best male friends, their best five female friends (with some information that help assess 
the intensity of their friendship) and five classmates with whom they would not share a train 
cabin during a field trip. Students who were absent on the day of the data collection did not 
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fill out this questionnaire but their names were listed on the blackboard, too. The background 
information included the ethnic identity of the students, asked in the form of two questions 
(what is your national or ethnic identity in the first place? what is your national or ethnic 
identity in the second place?) Schoolteachers were asked to provide grades and some 
additional information on a separate questionnaire. The school administration was then 
asked to assign the student identifiers to each name, and the names were removed from the 
questionnaires before they were collected by the data collection agency. Our data collection 
took place a few weeks before the testing day. We used these identifiers to merge 
administrative data on test scores once those scores became available. This data collection 
and the appropriateness of the measures taken to ensure privacy were approved by the 
Oktatasi Hivatal (Educational Agency, the governmental organization responsible for the 
testing). 
Figure A1.  
Distribution of the schools by the proportion of Roma students 
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APPENDIX B: DOCUMENTING THE SIMULATION EXERCISE 
 
The simulation exercise consists of three steps: (1) creating a simulated population of 8th 
grade students of different ethnicity (Roma or non-Roma) and achievement category (high-
achiever or low-achiever) estimated from a representative survey; (2) creating classes and 
peer groups within classes in this simulated population and simulating the ethnic 
composition of the peer group for each student, using administrative data on the ethnic 
composition of schools and representative survey data on the ethnic composition of classes 
within schools; (3) simulating the number of friends, by ethnicity, using estimates from our 
main analysis. The benchmark results of this exercise are our estimates of the friendship and 
hostility relations in the entire population. The purpose of this exercise is to compare its 
estimates to estimates under three alternative scenarios: equal ethnic distribution of classes; 
closing the achievement gap between Roma and non-Roma students; the two together: equal 
ethnic distribution and no gap. These alternative estimates are based on the same simulation 
exercises with appropriate changes in the composition of peer groups and students’ 
achievements. 
 
Step 1. The population of 8th grade students  
Source: Hungarian Life Course Survey (HLCS; the “Eletpalya” survey of TARKI). First survey 
wave, 10,022 adolescents interviewed in the fall after they finished 8th grade. 
 
Ethnicity 
Individuals are considered Roma if  
 they identified as Roma in any of the survey waves (asked in 4 out of 6 survey waves),  
 any of their parents identified themselves as Roma in any of the survey waves (asked 
in 2 out of 6 survey waves), or 
 any of their parents identified their parents or other ancestors as Roma in any of the 
survey waves (asked in 2 out of 6 survey waves). 
There are 1320 Roma individuals defined this way is in the sample; they fraction, using the 
appropriate sampling weights is 11% (using weight is necessary as low-achieving students 
were oversampled in the survey, resulting in an oversampling Roma students). 
 
Achievement 
Information on the grade point average (GPA) at the end of the 1st semester of 8th grade (the 
same point in time it is measured in the IEFH survey) is available in the administrative 
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National Assessment of Basic Competences (NABC) dataset. We linked this information to 
each student in the HLCS sample (the sampling frame of the HLCS sample was the NABC 
administrative data). 
This measure of GPA was missing for 1373 observations. We filled the missing values by 
predictions from a regression of GPA on Roma and piecewise linear splines of the reading 
and mathematics test scores (test scores were available for all students in the sample as the 
administrative test score data formed the frame of the sample). 
High-achieving students were defined as having a GPA of 3.5 or higher. 
 
Expanding the sample to the simulated population 
The HLCS represents the student population using its sampling weights (see earlier about the 
weights). These weights vary from 0.2 to 42.5 (mean is 10.9). We used the rounded integer 
values of the sampling weights of the HLCS survey (replaced it to 1 for the 124 observations 
for which the sampling weights were below 0.5). This resulted in a dataset of the simulated 
population of 8th grade students, n=109,119. This number is approximately the number of 8th 
grade students in the administrative data on test scores; the small difference is due to 
rounding errors. 
 
Step 2. The ethnic composition of the peer group  
 
Ethnic composition of the class 
Two sources of information are used to estimate the estimate the ethnic composition of the 
8th-grade class of the individuals in the HLCS sample.  
 The first wave of the HLCS as a categorical variable on students’ assessment of the 
composition of their class in 8th grade. We transformed the categories to estimated 
fractions (0.05 if “no or very few Roma”, 0.2 if “some Roma but less than half”, 0.5 if 
“half Roma”, 0.7 if “majority but not all Roma” and 1 if “all or almost all Roma”).  
 The school-level file of the NABC contains the school principals’ estimates of the 
fraction or Roma students in the entire school.  
 The first measure was missing for 138 of the 10,022 observations; the second measure 
was missing for 1,174 of the 10,022 observations; the two were jointly missing for 23 
observations; those were dropped from the analysis. 
We combined the two sources of information in the following way. We first took the average 
of the two measures (only one measure when the other one was missing). We then replaced 
the estimated fraction Roma to zero if the school-level estimate was less than 2 percent, and 
we replaced it to one if the school-level estimated was greater than 90 percent. 
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Ethnic composition of the peer group 
The peer group is defined as same-sex classmates. We have information on the size of the 8th-
grade class for each individual (from the linked administrative NABC database) but we have 
no complete information on the gender composition of the classes. We assumed that exactly 
half of each class is female. For each student the size of the peer group is the rounded integer 
of the half of the class minus one. For each student the number of Roma students in her or 
his peer group is the size of the peer group multiplied with the fraction Roma in the class and 
rounded to the nearest integer. For Roma students the number of Roma in their peer group is 
one minus this number. When this estimate turned out to be negative we replaced it by zero. 
The fraction of Roma in one’s peer group is the ratio of these two numbers: the estimated 
number of Roma students in the peer group divided by the estimated size of the peer group. 
 
Figure B1 shows the simulated fraction of Roma students in the peer groups or Roma 
students and non-Roma students. 46 percent of non-Roma students and 37 percent of Roma 
students have zero Roma in their peer group. The average number of Roma students in the 
peer group of non-Roma students is 9 percent, and the average number of Roma students in 
the peer group of Roma students is 21 percent. 
Figure B1 
 Simulated distribution of students’ exposure to Roma peers 
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Step 3. The estimated number of friends and adversaries 
 
We estimated the number of friends and adversaries Roma students receive, also by the 
ethnicity of the nominating peer, and the number of Roma friends and adversaries non-Roma 
students nominate. 
 
Estimation 
The estimation procedure is the same as the one outlined in sections 5 and 6 of the main text: 
We created categories by the fraction of Roma in the peer group using increments of 0.1 up to 
0.4 and 0.2 above. We then estimated the average number of friends and adversaries Roma 
students receive in those categories, separately for high-GPA Roma students and low-GPA 
Roma students. For the number of Roma peers nominated by non-Roma we created similar 
categories separately of the fraction of high-GPA Roma students and low-GPA Roma students 
and estimated the average number of peers non-Roma students nominate in the two-
dimensional distribution of these categorical variables. We replaced the number of friends to 
0 when the size of the appropriate peer group was 0.  
 
Importing estimates to the simulated data 
We used the first set of estimates to predict the number of friends and adversaries Roma 
students receive, by the GPA of the Roma student and fraction Roma in her or his peer group. 
We used the second set of estimates to predict the number of Roma friends and adversaries 
non-Roma students nominate by the two-dimensional distribution spanned by the categories 
of the fraction of high-GPA Roma students and low-GPA Roma students in the peer group. 
 
Benchmark 
 
Steps 1 through 3 provide the estimated number of friends and adversaries of Roma students 
under the current distribution of academic achievement and the ethnic composition of 
classes. These estimates for the benchmark to our policy simulations. 
 
Policy simulation 1: Equal ethnic distribution of students 
 
In this exercise we simulate the effect of equalizing the ethnic composition of classes across 
the nation. We simulate the fraction of Roma students in the peer groups of each student in 
the population first. We start with replacing the fraction of Roma students in each class from 
the benchmark estimates to 11 percent. In a typical class that would imply exactly two Roma 
students. Simply projecting this 11 percent fraction to each class-gender group would amount 
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to assume that of those two Roma students one is always a girl and one is a boy. Instead, a 
complete random allocation would result in a same-sex Roma students in only 50 percent of 
the cases. We implement this second assumption in our simulation exercise by allocating zero 
Roma peers to a random one quarter of class-gender groups and two peers to another 
quarter. 
 
Then we see the number of Roma students this fraction would imply in each group defined by 
class and gender by rounding the implied number to the nearest integer. Then we create the 
fraction of Roma students in the peer group of each student, defining the size of the peer 
group and the number of Roma peers the way we did in Step 2 above (making sure we don’t 
double count Roma students). This procedure incorporates the inherent indivisibility of peer 
groups that can result to zero Roma peers to many people.  
Figure B2 
 Simulated distribution of students’ exposure to Roma peers 
Equal ethnic composition of classes 
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Figure B2 shows the simulated fraction of Roma students in the peer groups or Roma 
students and non-Roma students in this scenario. Now only 27 percent of non-Roma 
students have zero Roma students in their peer group, and 69 percent of the Roma students 
have no Roma peer. The average number of Roma students in the peer group of non-Roma 
students is now 11 percent, while the average number of Roma students in the peer group of 
Roma students is 0.5 percent. 
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Applying the non-parametric regression estimates of the implied number of friends and 
adversaries to this simulated distribution of peer group composition we receive the following 
results. Table B1 shows the simulated number of friends and adversaries of Roma students; 
Table B2 shows the simulated percent of non-Roma students with at least one Roma friend 
and the percent with at least one Roma adversary. 
Table B1.  
Number of friends and adversaries of Roma students in the benchmark 
simulation and the simulated effect of equal ethnic distribution 
  Number of   Number of   Number of 
  Friends Adversaries   
Roma 
Friends 
Roma 
Adversaries 
  
Non-
Roma 
Friends 
Non-Roma 
Adversaries 
Friends and adversaries of low-achieving Roma students 
Benchmark 2.7 1.7 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
1.7 1.6 
Equal 
distribution 
2.2 2.1 
 
0.2 0.0 
 
2.1 2.1 
Equal - 
Benchmark 
-0.5 0.4 
 
-0.8 -0.1 
 
0.4 0.5 
                  
Friends and adversaries of high-achieving Roma students 
Benchmark 3.8 0.7 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
2.8 0.6 
Equal 
distribution 
3.7 0.9 
 
0.2 0.0 
 
3.6 0.9 
Equal – 
Benchmark 
-0.1 0.1 
 
-0.8 -0.1 
 
0.7 0.2 
                  
Friends and adversaries of an average Roma student 
Benchmark 3.1 1.4 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
2.1 1.3 
Equal 
distribution 
2.8 1.7 
 
0.2 0.0 
 
2.6 1.7 
Equal - 
Benchmark 
-0.3 0.3   -0.8 -0.1   0.5 0.4 
 
 
Table B2.  
The simulated percent of non-Roma students with Roma friends 
and adversaries 
 
Percent who have at least one 
 
Roma friend Roma adversary 
Benchmark estimates 18 14 
Equal ethnic distribution 26 15 
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The benchmark results are in line with our previous results from, with slightly different 
levels. These differences are due to the fact that the sample used for our main analysis is not 
representative of the entire population of 8th grade students in Hungary by design.  
 
Policy simulation 2: Closing the achievement gap 
 
In the benchmark simulated dataset 69 percent of the non-Roma students and only 34 
percent of the Roma students have high GPA (a GPA of 3.5 or more; maximum is 5.0). In this 
simulation exercise we increased the GPA of Roma students between 3.0 and 3.5 to above 
3.5. The fraction of high-GPA students in this exercise increased from 34 percent to 67 
percent. 
 
Table B3 shows the estimated number of friends and adversaries of Roma students in this 
case with the simulated ethnic distribution of peers and under the scenario of closing the 
achievement gap; Table B4 shows the simulated percent of non-Roma students with at least 
one Roma friend and the percent with at least one Roma adversary. 
 
The number of friends and adversaries of low-achieving Roma students and high-achieving 
Roma students is the same in this exercise as in the benchmark case. The difference is in the 
number of friends and adversaries of the average Roma student: these are a lot closer to the 
high-achieving numbers because this average student is now more likely to have high 
achievement. The percent of non-Roma students with Roma friends in this experiment is 
very similar to the previous experiment (25 percent versus 26 percent), but the percent with 
Roma adversaries is reduced substantially, to 5 percent. 
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Table B3.  
The number of friends and adversaries of Roma students in the benchmark 
scenario and the simulated scenario of closing the achievement gap 
  Number of   Number of   Number of 
  Friends Adversaries   
Roma 
Friends 
Roma 
Adversaries 
  
Non-
Roma 
Friends 
Non-Roma 
Adversaries 
Friends and adversaries of low-achieving Roma students 
Benchmark 2.7 1.7 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
1.7 1.6 
Closed gap 2.8 1.7 
 
1.1 0.2 
 
1.6 1.5 
Closed gap - 
Benchmark 
0.0 0.0 
 
0.1 0.0 
 
0.0 -0.1 
                  
Friends and adversaries of high-achieving Roma students 
Benchmark 3.8 0.7 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
2.8 0.6 
Closed gap 3.8 0.8 
 
0.9 0.1 
 
2.9 0.6 
Closed gap - 
Benchmark 
0.0 0.0 
 
0.0 0.0 
 
0.0 0.0 
                  
Friends and adversaries of an average Roma student 
Benchmark 3.1 1.4 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
2.1 1.3 
Closed gap 3.5 1.1 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
2.5 0.9 
Closed gap - 
Benchmark 
0.4 -0.3   0.0 0.0   0.4 -0.3 
 
Table B4.  
The simulated percent of non-Roma students with Roma friends 
and adversaries 
  Percent who have at least one 
  Roma friend Roma adversary 
Benchmark estimates 18 14 
Closing the achievement gap 25 5 
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Policy simulation 3: Equal ethnic distribution of students and closing the 
achievement gap 
 
Our third simulation exercise combines the previous two. Table B5 shows the simulated 
number of friends and adversaries of Roma students, and Table B6 shows the simulated 
percent of non-Roma students with at least one Roma friend and the percent with at least one 
Roma adversary. 
Table B5. 
The number of friends and adversaries of Roma students in the benchmark 
simulation and the simulated effect of equal ethnic distribution and closing the 
achievement gap at the same time 
  Number of   Number of   Number of 
  Friends Adversaries   
Roma 
Friends 
Roma 
Adversaries 
  
Non-
Roma 
Friends 
Non-Roma 
Adversaries 
Friends and adversaries of low-achieving Roma students 
Benchmark 2.7 1.7 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
1.7 1.6 
Equal distribution + 
closed gap 
2.3 2.1 
 
0.2 0.0 
 
2.0 2.1 
Equal + closed gap - 
Benchmark 
-0.5 0.4 
 
-0.8 -0.1 
 
0.4 0.5 
                  
Friends and adversaries of high-achieving Roma students 
Benchmark 3.8 0.7 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
2.8 0.6 
Equal distribution + 
closed gap 
3.7 0.9 
 
0.2 0.0 
 
3.6 0.9 
Equal + closed gap - 
Benchmark 
-0.1 0.1 
 
-0.8 -0.1 
 
0.7 0.2 
                  
Friends and adversaries of an average Roma student 
Benchmark 3.1 1.4 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
2.1 1.3 
Equal distribution + 
closed gap 
3.2 1.3 
 
0.2 0.0 
 
3.1 1.3 
Equal + closed gap - 
Benchmark 
0.2 -0.1   -0.8 -0.1   1.0 0.0 
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Table B6.  
The simulated percent of non-Roma students with Roma friends 
and adversaries 
  Percent who have at least one 
  Roma friend Roma adversary 
Benchmark estimates 18 14 
Equal distribution + closing the 
achievement gap 
32 10 
 
44 
 
 
Online Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table O1.  
Ethnic identification in the sample 
(All respondents who indicated a primary or a secondary identification) 
  
Primary 
identification (%) 
Secondary 
identification (%) 
Hungarian 81.5 6.9 
German 0.3 2.3 
Serbian 0.2 0.5 
Croat 0.1 0.4 
Romanian 0.8 1.2 
Slovak 0.0 0.5 
Roma/Cigany 16.2 4.5 
Other 0.8 1.8 
No 
identification 0.2 82.0 
Sum 100.0 100.0 
Observations 3,430 3,430 
 
 
 
Table O2.  
The distribution of friendship and adversary nominations in the sample  
(percent) 
  
# same-sex friends  
nominated by   
# opposite-sex friends  
nominated by   
# adversaries  
nominated by 
  Roma Non-Roma All   Roma Non-Roma All   Roma Non-Roma All 
0 3 2 2 
 
21 17 18 
 
41 0 54 
1 6 4 4 
 
12 12 12 
 
22 1 20 
2 10 9 9 
 
11 15 14 
 
19 2 13 
3 14 14 14 
 
14 17 16 
 
12 3 7 
4 17 16 16 
 
13 10 11 
 
4 4 4 
5 50 57 55 
 
30 28 28 
 
2 5 3 
Sum 100 100 100   100 100 100   100 15 100 
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Table O3.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA 
 OLS results without fixed-effects 
Dependent variable: 
nominations 
received from peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.46 -0.36 -0.08 -0.01  0.55 -0.35 
 (0.05)** (0.04)** (0.02)** (0.01)  (0.05)** (0.04)** 
Roma × GPA 0.14 -0.25 0.11 -0.05  0.03 -0.21 
(0.10) (0.10)** (0.07) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.09)* 
Roma -0.02 0.00 0.38 -0.12  -0.39 0.13 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)** (0.04)**  (0.09)** (0.07) 
Class FE NO NO NO NO  NO NO 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes. The number of friendship and adversary nominations from all peers as well as from 
Roma and non-Roma peers separately, as functions of GPA and ethnicity of the student. 
Peers are same-sex classmates. GPA is publicly observable grade point-average ranging from 
1 to 5, normalized to be zero at its mean value 3.5. 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 
Table O4.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA 
Results with class-gender fixed-effects 
Dependent variable: 
nominations 
received from peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.65 -0.49 -0.11 -0.02  0.76 -0.47 
 (0.06)** (0.06)** (0.03)** (0.02)  (0.06)** (0.05)** 
Roma × GPA 0.14 -0.19 0.08 -0.03  0.06 -0.16 
(0.13) (0.11) (0.08) (0.04)  (0.11) (0.10) 
Roma -0.08 0.11 0.24 -0.19  -0.32 0.31 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.10)* (0.05)**  (0.12)** (0.08)** 
Class-gender FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes: see Table O3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table O5. 
 Friends and adversaries as function of GPA  
Sample restricted to students who did not repeat grades  
and are not older than grade level age 15  
Dependent variable: 
nominations 
received from peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.48 -0.37 -0.11 -0.01  0.59 -0.36 
 (0.06)** (0.05)** (0.03)** (0.02)  (0.06)** (0.05)** 
Roma × GPA 0.17 -0.32 0.06 -0.07  0.11 -0.25 
(0.14) (0.12)* (0.09) (0.05)  (0.13) (0.12)* 
Roma -0.17 0.13 0.45 -0.14  -0.62 0.28 
 (0.14) (0.11) (0.11)** (0.05)**  (0.13)** (0.10)** 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 2,935 2,935 2,935 2,935  2,935 2,935 
Notes: see Table O3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table O6.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA 
Sample restricted to common support  
(peer group has at least two Roma and two non-Roma members) 
Dependent variable: 
nominations 
received from peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.47 -0.41 -0.21 -0.04  0.69 -0.37 
 (0.09)** (0.09)** (0.05)** (0.04)  (0.07)** (0.07)** 
Roma × GPA 0.32 -0.40 0.22 -0.01  0.10 -0.39 
(0.15)* (0.14)** (0.11)* (0.05)  (0.12) (0.12)** 
Roma -0.00 -0.02 0.49 -0.20  -0.49 0.19 
 (0.15) (0.12) (0.12)** (0.06)**  (0.14)** (0.09)* 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 1,571 1,571 1,571 1,571  1,571 1,571 
Notes: see Table O3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table O7.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA 
 Results with control variables 
Dep.va: 
nominations 
received 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.55 -0.41 -0.10 -0.02  0.65 -0.39 
 (0.06)** (0.06)** (0.03)** (0.02)  (0.06)** (0.05)** 
Roma × GPA 0.09 -0.23 0.11 -0.04  -0.03 -0.19 
(0.12) (0.11)* (0.08) (0.04)  (0.11) (0.10) 
Roma -0.01 0.01 0.42 -0.15  -0.43 0.16 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.10)** (0.05)**  (0.12)** (0.09) 
Repeated grade 0.03 0.17 0.14 -0.02  -0.11 0.20 
(0.17) (0.15) (0.08) (0.05)  (0.15) (0.14) 
Age 14 -0.33 0.15 0.05 0.03  -0.39 0.13 
 (0.08)** (0.08)* (0.05) (0.03)  (0.08)** (0.07) 
Age 16 0.07 -0.07 0.01 -0.04  0.06 -0.04 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.02)  (0.08) (0.08) 
Age 17 or more -0.29 0.12 -0.07 0.10  -0.22 0.02 
(0.16) (0.17) (0.07) (0.05)  (0.14) (0.14) 
Years in preschool -0.78 0.19 -0.30 0.03  -0.49 0.17 
(0.24)** (0.28) (0.13)* (0.08)  (0.20)* (0.24) 
Mother’s educ. 
8 grades 
0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.00  0.07 -0.05 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.04) (0.04) 
Mother’s educ. 
vocational  
0.27 -0.23 0.10 -0.07  0.17 -0.16 
(0.21) (0.21) (0.14) (0.08)  (0.15) (0.17) 
Mother’s educ. 
high school 
0.46 -0.32 0.06 -0.07  0.40 -0.25 
(0.22)* (0.21) (0.15) (0.08)  (0.16)* (0.17) 
Mother’s educ. 
college  
0.45 -0.35 -0.00 -0.05  0.44 -0.30 
(0.23) (0.22) (0.15) (0.08)  (0.18)* (0.18) 
Mother’s educ. 
missing 
0.27 -0.22 -0.04 0.03  0.30 -0.24 
(0.24) (0.23) (0.15) (0.09)  (0.20) (0.19) 
Class FE -0.05 0.21 0.29 -0.09  -0.33 0.30 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes: see Table O3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** 
p<0.01
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Table O8.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA 
 Results with class-gender fixed-effects, control variables  
and sample restricted to common support 
Dependent variable: 
nominations 
received from peers 
Friends Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  
From Roma 
classmates 
 
From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.46 -0.42 -0.20 -0.05  0.66 -0.36 
 (0.10)** (0.09)** (0.06)** (0.04)  (0.08)** (0.07)** 
Roma × GPA 0.24 -0.28 0.15 0.03  0.08 -0.32 
(0.15) (0.14)* (0.11) (0.05)  (0.13) (0.13)* 
Roma 0.07 -0.04 0.34 -0.20  -0.27 0.17 
 (0.16) (0.13) (0.13)** (0.07)**  (0.15) (0.10) 
Class-gender FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
Control variables YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 1,571 1,571 1,571 1,571  1,571 1,571 
Notes: see Table O3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 
Table O9.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA 
 Nominations capped at 4 
Dependent variable: 
nominations 
received from peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.49 -0.42 -0.10 -0.02  0.60 -0.40 
 (0.05)** (0.05)** (0.02)** (0.01)  (0.05)** (0.04)** 
Roma × GPA 0.10 -0.25 0.08 -0.05  0.02 -0.21 
(0.12) (0.11)* (0.08) (0.04)  (0.10) (0.10)* 
Roma -0.06 0.10 0.47 -0.12  -0.53 0.23 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.09)** (0.04)**  (0.10)** (0.08)** 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes: see Table O3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01
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Table O10. 
 Friends and adversaries as function of GPA 
Nominations weighted by the friends of the nominating students 
Dependent variable: 
nominations received 
from peers weighted 
by their friends 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.84 -0.45 -0.09 0.00  0.97 -0.43 
 (0.13)** (0.10)** (0.02)** (0.02)  (0.12)** (0.08)** 
Roma × GPA 0.34 -0.52 0.18 -0.04  -0.17 -0.39 
(0.26) (0.18)** (0.11) (0.05)  (0.19) (0.16)* 
Roma -0.39 0.11 0.65 -0.15  -1.24 0.34 
 (0.28) (0.19) (0.16)** (0.06)*  (0.24)** (0.14)* 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes. Dependent variable: The number of friendship and adversary nominations from all 
peers as well as from Roma and non-Roma peers separately, weighted by the friendship 
nominations they receive; the number of same-sex friends of each nominating friend or 
adversary is added and the result is divided by two (when Roma or non-Roma nominations 
are considered only same ethnicity friends are added). Peers are same-sex classmates. Right 
hand side variable: GPA is publicly observable grade point-average ranging from 1 to 5, 
normalized to be zero at its mean value 3.5. 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table O11.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA 
Relations defined as the union of nominations given and received 
Dependent 
variable: measure 
of popularity 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.31 -0.36 -0.13 0.02  0.47 -0.35 
 (0.05)** (0.06)** (0.02)** (0.02)  (0.05)** (0.05)** 
Roma × GPA 0.25 -0.19 0.08 0.01  0.15 -0.25 
(0.11)* (0.12) (0.08) (0.06)  (0.11) (0.12)* 
Roma -0.03 -0.03 0.43 -0.31  -0.56 0.47 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)** (0.06)**  (0.12)** (0.12)** 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes. Dependent variable: The number of friends and adversaries defined as the union of 
nominations given and received (number of peers who were nominated by the student or who 
nominated the student). All peers as well as from Roma and non-Roma peers separately. 
Peers are same-sex classmates. Right hand side variable: GPA is publicly observable grade 
point-average ranging from 1 to 5, normalized to be zero at its mean value 3.5. 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table O12.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA 
Reciprocal relations 
Dependent 
variable: measure 
of popularity 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.39 -0.03 -0.10 0.01  0.48 -0.04 
 (0.04)** (0.02)* (0.02)** (0.01)  (0.04)** (0.01)** 
Roma × GPA -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.01  -0.05 -0.03 
(0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.02)  (0.08) (0.03) 
Roma -0.06 0.06 0.49 -0.01  -0.55 0.07 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.08)** (0.02)  (0.09)** (0.03)* 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes. Dependent variable: The number of reciprocal friends and reciprocal adversaries 
(number of peers who were nominated by the student and who nominated the student at the 
same time). All peers as well as from Roma and non-Roma peers separately. Peers are same-
sex classmates. Right hand side variable: GPA is publicly observable grade point-average 
ranging from 1 to 5, normalized to be zero at its mean value 3.5. 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table O13.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA 
The Echenique-Fryer measure of popularity on the LHS 
Dependent variable:  
measure of popularity 
Friends   Roma friends Non-Roma friends 
  of Roma students of non-Roma students 
GPA 0.14  -0.09 0.20 
 (0.02)**  (0.05) (0.02)** 
Roma × GPA 0.12    
 (0.05)*    
Roma -0.51    
 (0.16)**    
Class FE YES  YES YES 
N 3,430  774 2,853 
Notes. Dependent variable: The Echenique-Fryer (2007) measure of 
popularity, as used by Fryer and Torelli (2010). Intuitively, it measures 
the number of friends weighted by the number of their friends, iterated. 
Technically, it uses the symmetric matrix of connections (using the union 
of nominations given and received.), and takes the largest eigenvalue and 
the corresponding eigenvector of the matrix, multiplies the two, and 
multiplies it with the determinant of the matrix. The individual measure 
of is the value of this vector that corresponds to the individual. The 
measure can be computed for friendship among all students as well as 
friendship within ethnic groups (it is defined for symmetric and transitive 
relations, so it is not defined for adversary relationships or relationships 
across ethnic groups). 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; 
** p<0.01 
Table O14.  
Friends and adversaries of opposite sex (nominations received) and GPA 
Dep. variable: # 
nominations from 
opposite-sex peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.65 -0.75 -0.02 -0.08  0.66 -0.67 
 (0.08)** (0.06)** (0.02) (0.02)**  (0.07)** (0.06)** 
Roma × GPA 0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.01  0.02 -0.05 
(0.16) (0.13) (0.07) (0.04)  (0.13) (0.12) 
Roma 0.06 0.10 0.21 -0.11  -0.15 0.21 
 (0.15) (0.10) (0.08)** (0.03)**  (0.12) (0.09)* 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes: see Table O3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table O15.  
Friends and adversaries of opposite sex (nominations originated) and GPA 
Dep. variable: # 
nominations of 
opposite-sex peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.23 0.08 -0.03 0.04  0.26 0.02 
 (0.05)** (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)*  (0.05)** (0.04) 
Roma × GPA 0.01 0.11 -0.07 0.10  0.05 -0.07 
(0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04)*  (0.09) (0.08) 
Roma 0.28 0.01 0.25 -0.12  -0.11 0.29 
 (0.11)** (0.07) (0.07)** (0.04)**  (0.10) (0.09)** 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes: see Table O3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table O16.  
Friends and adversaries of opposite sex (reciprocated nominations) and GPA 
Dep. variable: # 
reciprocated 
nominations of 
opposite-sex  
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.58 -0.44 -0.11 -0.02  0.69 -0.42 
 (0.06)** (0.05)** (0.02)** (0.01)  (0.05)** (0.05)** 
Roma × GPA 0.21 -0.27 0.16 -0.06  0.04 -0.21 
(0.12) (0.11)* (0.08)* (0.04)  (0.11) (0.10)* 
Roma -0.10 0.10 0.50 -0.15  -0.59 0.25 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.10)** (0.05)**  (0.12)** (0.08)** 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes: see Table O3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table O17.  
Friends and adversaries and GPA, for students who identified as Roma in the 1st 
place, in the 2nd place (reference group_ non-Roma) 
Dep. variable: # 
reciprocated 
nominations of 
opposite-sex  
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.58 -0.44 -0.11 -0.02  0.69 -0.42 
 (0.06)** (0.05)** (0.02)** (0.01)  (0.05)** (0.05)** 
Roma 1st × GPA 0.20 -0.25 0.19 -0.04  0.02 -0.21 
(0.14) (0.12)* (0.10) (0.04)  (0.13) (0.12) 
Roma 2nd × GPA 0.15 -0.33 0.17 -0.10  -0.02 -0.23 
 (0.21) (0.19) (0.11) (0.08)  (0.20) (0.17) 
Roma in 1st place -0.15 0.12 0.58 -0.13  -0.72 0.25 
(0.14) (0.10) (0.11)** (0.05)**  (0.14)** (0.09)** 
Roma in 2nd place 0.06 0.08 0.26 -0.17  -0.20 0.26 
 (0.19) (0.18) (0.13)* (0.08)*  (0.18) (0.14) 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes: see Table O3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table O18.  
Friends and adversaries of female students as function of GPA 
Dependent variable: 
nominations 
received from same-
sex peers  
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.74 -0.53 -0.12 -0.04  0.86 -0.50 
 (0.09)** (0.09)** (0.04)** (0.02)  (0.08)** (0.08)** 
Roma × GPA 0.10 -0.13 0.08 0.02  0.03 -0.15 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.11) (0.05)  (0.15) (0.15) 
Roma -0.16 0.16 0.19 -0.15  -0.35 0.30 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.06)*  (0.14)* (0.12)* 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes: see Table O3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table O19.  
Friends and adversaries of male students as function of GPA 
Dependent variable: 
nominations 
received from same-
sex peers  
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.59 -0.45 -0.11 -0.00  0.71 -0.44 
 (0.09)** (0.07)** (0.03)** (0.02)  (0.08)** (0.06)** 
Roma × GPA 0.40 -0.28 0.18 -0.11  0.22 -0.18 
(0.19)* (0.14)* (0.11) (0.05)*  (0.17) (0.14) 
Roma 0.22 0.02 0.40 -0.27  -0.18 0.30 
 (0.23) (0.13) (0.15)** (0.07)**  (0.21) (0.11)** 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes: see Table O3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table O20.  
Friends and adversaries of students as function of GPA 
 Peer groups with high average GPA  
Dependent variable: 
nominations 
received from same-
sex peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.73 -0.53 -0.07 -0.01  0.80 -0.52 
 (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.03)* (0.02)  (0.08)** (0.07)** 
Roma × GPA 0.25 -0.19 -0.00 0.06  0.25 -0.25 
(0.20) (0.21) (0.12) (0.05)  (0.18) (0.19) 
Roma -0.23 0.24 0.36 -0.05  -0.59 0.30 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.15)* (0.05)  (0.15)** (0.14)* 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716  1,716 1,716 
Notes: see Table O3. Higher than average GPA: Average GPA in same-sex peer group is in the 
top half or the average GPA distribution (above 3.6). Standard errors, clustered at the class 
level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 
 
Table O21.  
Friends and adversaries of students as function of GPA 
 Peer groups with low average GPA  
Dependent variable: 
nominations 
received from same-
sex peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.50 -0.41 -0.15 -0.01  0.65 -0.39 
 (0.09)** (0.07)** (0.04)** (0.02)  (0.07)** (0.06)** 
Roma × GPA 0.41 -0.33 0.26 -0.13  0.15 -0.19 
(0.15)** (0.13)* (0.10)* (0.04)**  (0.15) (0.12) 
Roma 0.19 -0.04 0.48 -0.28  -0.29 0.24 
 (0.17) (0.13) (0.13)** (0.05)**  (0.16) (0.11)* 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 1,771 1,771 1,771 1,771  1,771 1,771 
Notes: see Table O3. Lower than average GPA: Average GPA in same-sex peer group is in the 
bottom half or the average GPA distribution (less than or equal to 3.6). Standard errors, 
clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table O21.  
Friends and adversaries of students as function of GPA 
Towns with lower than median prejudice 
Dependent variable: 
nominations 
received from same-
sex peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.55 -0.41 -0.13 0.00  0.68 -0.40 
 (0.09)** (0.08)** (0.03)** (0.02)  (0.08)** (0.07)** 
Roma × GPA 0.15 -0.34 0.26 -0.11  -0.11 -0.23 
(0.17) (0.15)* (0.11)* (0.06)  (0.16) (0.14) 
Roma -0.13 0.02 0.55 -0.21  -0.68 0.23 
 (0.18) (0.14) (0.13)** (0.06)**  (0.17)** (0.12) 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 1,659 1,659 1,659 1,659  1,659 1,659 
Notes: see Table O3. Lower than average prejudice: Fraction of votes on Jobbik (far-right 
party) in town in the general election of 2010 is less than 22% (median in the sample). 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 
 
Table O22.  
Friends and adversaries of students as function of GPA 
 Towns with higher than median prejudice 
Dependent variable: 
nominations 
received from same-
sex peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.62 -0.47 -0.08 -0.03  0.70 -0.43 
 (0.08)** (0.06)** (0.03)* (0.02)  (0.08)** (0.06)** 
Roma × GPA 0.27 -0.21 0.07 -0.01  0.19 -0.20 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.11) (0.05)  (0.14) (0.14) 
Roma -0.06 0.18 0.45 -0.09  -0.51 0.27 
 (0.16) (0.14) (0.14)** (0.07)  (0.15)** (0.12)* 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 1,771 1,771 1,771 1,771  1,771 1,771 
Notes: see Table O3. Fraction of votes on Jobbik (far-right party) in town in the general 
election of 2010 is more than or equal to 22% (median in the sample). Standard errors, 
clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table O23.  
Friends and adversaries of students as function of GPA, interacted with 
mother’s education, subsample of non-Roma students 
Dependent 
variable: 
nominations 
received from 
same-sex peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From peers with low-
educated mother 
 From peers with low-
educated mother 
GPA 0.51 -0.40 -0.01 -0.06  0.52 -0.34 
 (0.06)** (0.05)** (0.03) (0.02)**  (0.06)** (0.05)** 
Low ed. mother × 
GPA 
0.12 0.00 0.05 0.02  0.07 -0.01 
(0.13) (0.15) (0.08) (0.07)  (0.12) (0.11) 
Low ed. mother -0.21 0.19 -0.04 0.01  -0.17 0.18 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.08) (0.04)  (0.10) (0.09) 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 2,710 2,710 2,710 2,710  2,710 2,710 
Notes. The number of friendship and adversary nominations from all peers as well as from 
peers separated by whether they mother has low education, as functions of GPA and ethnicity 
of the student. Low educated mother: 0-8 primary schools (18% in the non-Roma sample; it 
would be 70% in the Roma sample). Peers are same-sex classmates. GPA is publicly 
observable grade point-average ranging from 1 to 5, normalized to be zero at its mean value 
3.5. 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table O24.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA as well as the average of the 
standardized test scores in mathematics and reading 
Dep. variable: # 
nominations from 
peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.49 -0.37 -0.11 -0.01  0.61 -0.35 
 (0.08)** (0.07)** (0.03)** (0.02)  (0.07)** (0.06)** 
Test score 0.08 -0.09 0.01 -0.01  0.07 -0.08 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.08) (0.07) 
Roma × GPA 0.20 -0.22 0.15 -0.00  0.04 -0.22 
 (0.14) (0.12) (0.09) (0.04)  (0.14) (0.11) 
Roma × test score 0.02 -0.13 -0.04 -0.09  0.07 -0.04 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.05)  (0.13) (0.10) 
Roma -0.03 0.05 0.49 -0.17  -0.53 0.22 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.11)** (0.05)**  (0.13)** (0.10)* 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,154 3,154 3,154 3,154  3,154 3,154 
Notes. Dependent variable: The number of friendship and adversary nominations from all 
peers as well as from Roma and non-Roma peers separately. Peers are same-sex classmates. 
Main right-hand-side variables: GPA (publicly observable) and standardized scores of low-
stakes test in mathematics and reading (the simple average of the two scores; results of this 
test are typically unobservable to the students). 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table O25.  
Subsequent academic outcomes as function of GPA as well as the average of the 
standardized test scores in mathematics and reading 
Dependent variable: 
future academic 
outcomes 
Admission to 
academic 
secondary school  
Dropout from 
secondary 
school 
GPA in 
grade 10 
Standardized test 
score in grade 10 
reading maths 
GPA 0.24 -0.08 0.76 0.28 0.19 
 (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.05)** (0.02)** (0.03)** 
Test score 0.06 -0.02 0.19 0.75 0.74 
(0.01)** (0.01)* (0.05)** (0.02)** (0.03)** 
Roma × GPA -0.03 -0.12 0.02 -0.03 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03)** (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
Roma × test score -0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.11 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Roma 0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.17 
 (0.03) (0.02)* (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)** 
Class FE YES YES YES YES YES 
N 3,154 3,154 3,154 3,154 3,154 
Notes. Dependent variables: whether admitted to academic secondary school (“gimnazium”) 
after grade 8; whether dropped out of secondary school by the end of grade 10; GPA (1 
through 5) at mid-year in grade 10; standardized (0,1) scores of low-stakes tests in reading 
and mathematics at the end of grade 10. Main right-hand-side variables: se previous table. 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
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Table O26.  
Friends and adversaries of Roma students and the ethnic composition of their 
peer group, interacted with whether they have high GPA 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Non-Roma students Number of 
friends  
Number of 
Adversaries 
 Number of 
friends 
Number of 
Adversaries 
High-GPA student 1.24 -1.01  1.25 -1.16 
 (0.23)** (0.19)**  (0.32)** (0.28)** 
Fraction Roma among peers 4.27 -2.08  4.66 -0.95 
(0.96)** (0.97)*  (1.59)** (2.43) 
Fraction Roma squared -3.59 0.25  -4.21 0.45 
(0.93)** (1.09)  (1.34)** (1.91) 
High-GPA student 
interacted with fraction 
Roma squared 
-1.44 1.25  -1.18 1.05 
(0.43)** (0.34)**  (0.51)* (0.45)* 
Class FE NO NO  YES YES 
Control variables NO NO  NO NO 
N 710 710  710 710 
Notes. Peers refer to same-sex classmates (not including the student).  High-GPA refers to 
grade point average higher than 3.5 (the overall average and median; the 80th percentile 
among Roma students and the 40th percentile among non-Roma students). The interaction of 
high-GPA and the linear term of fraction Roma is dropped from the specification as it is 
never statistically significant. The predicted left hand side variables have the same shape 
from the OLS and the FE regressions; they overlap completely for the number of friends and 
the discrepancy is small for the number of adversaries.  
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table O27.  
Friends and adversaries of Roma students and the ethnic composition of their 
peer group, interacted with whether they have high GPA 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Non-Roma students Number of 
friends  
Number of 
Adversaries 
 Number of 
friends 
Number of 
Adversaries 
High-GPA student 1.10 -0.96  1.13 -1.03 
 (0.24)** (0.19)**  (0.34)** (0.32)** 
Fraction Roma among peers 4.52 -2.14  4.83 -1.14 
(0.95)** (0.93)*  (1.62)** (2.49) 
Fraction Roma squared -3.83 0.36  -4.54 0.68 
(0.92)** (1.05)  (1.34)** (1.96) 
High-GPA student 
interacted with fraction 
Roma squared 
-1.34 1.19  -1.03 0.92 
(0.44)** (0.36)**  (0.51)* (0.51) 
Class FE NO NO  YES YES 
Control variables YES YES  YES YES 
N 707 707  707 707 
Notes. See table B23. Control variables are gender, year of age dummies, whether repeated 
grade, years in preschool, mother’s education. 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table O28.  
The probability that non-Roma students nominate Roma students  
as friends and adversaries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Nominated any 
Roma friend   
Nominated any 
Roma adversary 
Nominated any 
Roma friend   
Nominated any 
Roma adversary 
Fraction low-GPA 
Roma among 
peers 
1.22 1.81 1.41 1.64 
(0.17)** (0.16)** (0.34)** (0.31)** 
Fraction low-GPA 
Roma, squared 
-0.44 -2.01 -0.92 -1.80 
(0.24) (0.28)** (0.63) (0.63)** 
Fraction high-
GPA Roma 
among peers 
2.79 0.18 2.74 0.07 
(0.26)** (0.24) (0.38)** (0.39) 
Fraction high-
GPA Roma, 
squared 
-2.26 -0.27 -1.88 -0.60 
(0.54)** (0.54) (0.70)** (0.64) 
Constant 
0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 
(0.01)** (0.01)** (0.03) (0.03)* 
Class FE NO NO YES YES 
N 2,719 2,719 2,719 2,719 
Notes. Peers refer to same-sex classmates.  High-achieving refers to grade point average 
higher than 3.5 (the overall average and median; the 80th percentile among Roma students 
and the 40th percentile among non-Roma students). 
The constant is the average of the class fixed-effects. The fraction Roma among peers and the 
fraction of high-GPA Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Figure O1 
The distribution of classes in the sample by the fraction of Roma students 
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Figure O2 
The distribution of students in the sample by their grade point average (GPA) 
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Figure O3 
 
The distribution of students in the sample by their standardized test scores 
(reading and mathematics) 
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Figure O4 
The distribution of students in the number of friendship  
nominations they receive 
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Figure O5 
The distribution of students in the number of adversary  
nominations they receive 
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Figure O6 
Number of friends and adversaries of Roma students by the fraction of Roma 
students in the group. Same-sex nominations;  
number of nominations capped at 4 
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Figure O7 
Number of friends and adversaries of Roma students by the fraction of Roma 
students in the group. Opposite-sex nominations 
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Figure O8 
 
Number of Roma friends and adversaries of Roma students by the fraction of 
Roma students in their peer group 
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Figure O9 
 
Number of non-Roma friends and adversaries of Roma students by the fraction 
of Roma students in their peer group 
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Figure O10 
 
The percentage of non-Roma students nominating Roma students as a friend 
and as an adversary  
Same-sex nominations; number of nominations capped at 4 
 (As a function of the fraction of low-achieving Roma students and the fraction of high-GPA 
Roma students in the peer group; both of these fractions are aggregated to categories;  
variance of the estimates computed as p(1-p)/#schools) 
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Figure O11 
 
The percentage of non-Roma students nominating Roma students as a friend 
and as an adversary  
Opposite-sex nominations 
 (As a function of the fraction of low-achieving Roma students and the fraction of high-GPA 
Roma students in the peer group; both of these fractions are aggregated to categories;  
variance of the estimates computed as p(1-p)/#schools) 
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